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In their paper, “Schools as social complex adaptive systems: A new way to 
understand the challenges of introducing the health promoting schools concept’  
Keshavarz, Nutbeam, Rowling and Khavarpour (2010) have made a courageous move 
in attempting to apply complexity theory to the problem of how to better understand 
why school health programmes have not always been as successful a policy-makers 
have hoped.  Theories of complex adaptive systems (I use complexity theory and 
theories of complex adaptive systems [CAS] interchangeably) arguably have the 
potential to examine and articulate many aspects of complex phenomena which have 
hitherto defied articulation by more conventional means, in both the natural and the 
social worlds. Working out exactly how this potential may be realised, however, is an 
enormous challenge.  
 
One of the most difficult aspects of this challenge is working out what a complexity 
approach might mean in terms of research methodology, given that complexity seems 
to suggest a different ontology (and therefore arguably a different epistemology) to 
that which usually underpins conventional approaches to research. Keshavarz et al 
(2010) have understood that issues of ontology and epistemology are at stake, but they 
have had difficulty in working out a cohesive response to this very difficult issue. At 
some points in the paper they appear to be taking a predominately realise position, 
seeking empirical evidence that will justify  a claim that schools actually are complex 
adaptive systems (in the same way that ant colonies or bee hives may be said to be 
such systems). In other places, they maintain this realist position but express some 
doubts about the status of complexity as a theory, indicating a dissatisfaction with the 
lack of experimental studies which attempt to verify it. In other places, however, what 
is initially taken for granted in these ways becomes much more provisional, and at 
one point complexity is discussed as being only metaphorical. The authors seem to be 
unsure as to whether they are seeking realist forms of empirically-based explanation, 
or more interpretative forms of understanding created out of interview data. In a sense 
they seem to be trying to have both approaches at once, which may be one of the 
reasons they have chosen complexity as a set of ideas to work with Keshavarz et al 
(2010). The radical challenges suggested by complexity could include a challenge to 
this kind of conventional research polarity. To meet such a challenge using 
complexity, however, arguably suggests that a new kind of coherence has to be 
created, and I don’t think the authors have achieved this.  
 
The discussion of using CAS as ‘an approach’ seems to imply that certain 
methodological, conceptual and analytical procedures follow from the theory/ 
conceptual framework of CAS, but what these procedures might be is not discussed 
(see Byrne, 2005; Davis & Sumara, 2006; Haggis, 2008 & 2009, for further 
discussion of these issues). Working out the possible implications of complexity for 
methodology, methods and research design is no easy task, but arguably one which 
was needed if it was intended that the research approach be ‘based on’ theories of 
complex adaptive systems Keshavarz et al (2010).  
There seem to be two research questions underpinning this study. The first is: 
 
Does thinking of schools as CAS help us to understand the failure of health-
promoting schools (HPS) policies?’   
 
The second is: 
 
What do people have to say about their experiences of HPS initiatives?’ 
 
The first is a conceptual question, which did not necessarily imply the need for the 
collection of empirical data (or, at least, perhaps not data in the form of personal 
narratives). The second question is not a complexity-based question. Comparing 
interview data with documentary analysis is also still not a procedure directly implied 
by theories of CAS, though it might begin to move in this direction if an argument 
was made that a methodological implication of complexity was the need to gather 
information about a range of systems, across a range of different levels. Complexity 
arguably implies consideration of issues such as initial conditions, history/movement 
through time, specificity, and emergence, and, for some writers, also phase shifts, 
‘lock-in’, path-dependency etc.  
 
The confusion of aims and the vagueness about the analytical and methodological 
implications of complexity can also be seen in the assumption that what people say in 
interview is synonymous with the actual practices and workings of the school (eg. the 
fact that participants recognise cultural diversity seems to be taken as evidence of 
diversity in terms of the agents within the school as a CAS), and also perhaps in the 
assumption that the statements used in plans and reports accurately reflect actions 
which actually might be carried out. Both interview data and plans/reports are 
described as giving ‘information’, without acknowledgment of the fact that interview 
data are self-reported narrative, and that plans and reports have to use rhetorical 
devices which reflect particular cultural and political contexts and times. 
 
Taking account of these problems in relation to what the authors seem to be interested 
in, it seems to me that their argument would have been stronger if it had run 
something like this:  
 
We set out to explore the perspectives of relevant actors across a range of 
contexts in order to try to get a sense of why people felt HPS policies had 
failed. Both actor narratives and institutional plans suggested strong context-
dependency in relation to expressed views and strategies for policy 
implementation. This diversity of narratives and institutional responses led us 
to consider some of the implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions 
underpinning the research. For example, the idea that collecting a range of 
individual views and examining texts from different contexts might identify 
recurrent problems or themes, which would enable us to understand the more 
general mechanisms which are at work when schools try to implement 
policies. We were forced to reconsider these assumptions (which are the 
assumptions which underpin a great deal of research in many fields) and 
instead to consider how we might conceptualise the diversity and context-
specificity which we found. This led us to wonder how our interest in 
understanding the failure of policy might change if we conceptualised schools, 
and the multiple contexts within which they are embedded, as complex 
adaptive systems. If we were to redesign the research with hindsight, our 
research questions would be: 
 
How are we conceptualising the schools that we apply the health promoting 
school policy to?  
 
Can theories of CAS improve on this conceptualisation/offer a new 
conceptualisation that might shed more, or different, light on the failure of the 
policy? 
 
If the researchers had been able to make an argument that a complexity-based 
ontology applied to schools suggested the use of interviews with some of the agents 
within the schools being investigated, a new research question might then have arisen: 
 
Do human agents understand themselves to be part of something that might be 
conceptualised as a complex adaptive system?  
 
This is not the same question as whether or not observation of a school’s functioning 
might or might not provide evidence that schools fit the criteria of CAS. It also points 
towards the difficult problem of how the conscious awareness of agents in a CAS 
might affect the workings of an otherwise ‘unconscious’ system which is operating in 
response to distributed forms of control. 
 
Keshavarz et al (2010) in one sense seem to want complexity to be a ‘hard science’ 
kind of theory, in the sense of something that is clear, cohesive, and, at least 
hypothetically, paving the way for the discovery of laws and regularities. Their desire 
to unify the diversity of theories, and the discussion of the lack of experimental 
studies which attempt to verify the theory support this idea. Their views of complexity 
theories, in this regard, seem to be that such theories are not yet sufficiently 
developed, and that this is why they are difficult to apply. But theories of complex 
adaptive systems and complexity are well developed in the hard sciences already, and 
function as well mathematically as they do metaphorically (see Richardson & Cilliers, 
2001, and Byrne, 2005, for discussion of different kinds of complexity theory). 
Keshavarz et al (2010) seem to be suggesting that they have invented the idea of a 
social complex adaptive system, but researchers have also been using complexity 
theories in the social sciences for some time. For example, Byrne (2005) in Sociology, 
Davis & Sumara (2006) in Education, and Valsiner (1998) and Fogel (1993) in 
Psychology. Sawyer’s (2005) book ‘Social Emergence: Societies as complex systems’ 
gives an overview of recent work in this area.  
 
Complexity theory is not a monolithic, unidimensional theory. Aspects of these ideas 
can be found in Margaret Archer’s (2000) morphogenetic theory, Hillier’s (1998) 
analysis of urban architecture, Buchanan’s (1998) discussion of research into patterns 
of crime, and Kevin Kelly’s (1994) analysis of ‘the new biology of machines’. 
Complexity ideas underpin popular books such as Gribbin’s (2004) Deep Simplicity, 
and Ball’s (2004) Critical Mass, and are the basis of ideas such as ‘the tipping point’ 
which have entered popular vocabulary.  
 Using complexity ideas and theories is challenging, but not because ‘the theory’ itself 
is ‘too complex’ or ‘poorly defined’. A recognition of both uncertainty and 
imprecision are key structural elements of these types of thinking. Complexity 
theories could be seen as one way of attempting to articulate some of the limits of 
human understanding in relation to both natural and social phenomena. Rather than 
trying to be ‘complete’, to offer explanations which it is hoped, over time, will 
become more ‘accurate’, at least some interpretations of complexity theories suggest 
that there are aspects of natural and social phenomena which will always be out of 
reach. The multiple interactions within and beyond whatever complex adaptive 
system is the focus of analysis are too numerous, too recursive, too dynamic and too 
responsive to ever be tracked or predicted beyond certain limits (to say nothing of 
trying to understand the role of emergence within such processes…). 
 
The principles of uncertainty, multiplicity, specificity, and continuing change 
challenge many conventional assumptions about carrying out research. Bringing in 
the importance of initial conditions, history and time, theories of complex adaptive 
systems challenge the Newtonian idea that effects are straightforwardly predictable 
and proportional in relation to causes. Small differences in initial conditions can result 
in widely divergent emergent effects through time, and predictability is limited. The 
importance of history suggests that phenomena have to be studied over time; the idea 
of ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ implies singularity (rather than 
generality), which might be seen as implying that there are serious limits to what can 
be learnt about complex adaptive systems if they are only studied cross-sectionally 
(see Haggis, 2008, for further discussion of this). If the entities which are of interest to 
educators (eg. people, groups, departments, institutions, societies) are seen as being 
dynamic, continually emerging through time, and specific to local constellations of 
conditions (ie. irreducibly particular, incapable of being meaningfully compressed 
into a model or reduced to underlying principles)1, then complexity presents 
researchers with the challenge of working out what it means to say that ‘knowledge 
must be contextual’ (Byrne, 2005; Haggis, 2008).  
 
Keshavarz et al (2010) seem to come to this conclusion from the analysis of their 
data. Their study, conceptualised slightly differently, could be seen as presenting 
interesting data in support of the idea that it is necessary to formally acknowledge 
diversity and context-specificity. Indeed, if their main research question was ‘Why do 
HPS policies fail?’ it seems to me that they could have argued convincingly, on the 
basis of this data, that one possible answer is ‘because of context-dependency’. This 
may not be the answer that researchers want, because it presents them with the 
somewhat desperate dilemma of how they are supposed to respond to such an idea. It 
is not, of course, a new dilemma. Researchers, at least in the social sciences, have 
been forced to confront empirical evidence suggesting this answer time and time 
again, but it is almost impossible to make a case for such an answer within the 
epistemological and ontological constraints of conventional approaches to research. 
The failure of conventional research to move beyond the limits of the kinds of 
answers it has been generating for decades (eg. ‘Sorry, we still can’t tell you why so 
many kids fail, but we’re starting an extra large study right now which will soon bring 
                                                 
1
 Note, however, that ‘local’ can apply to large social systems, as well as to the smaller systems which 
may be embedded within larger ones 
you this answer’) is arguably because, without complexity, or something similar, (and 
there are various other theories which might also do this job) it is not possible to 
answer some of the most recalcitrant of educational (or social) questions. 
 
I said at the beginning of this paper that theories of complex adaptive systems and 
complexity arguably have the potential to examine and articulate many aspects of 
complex phenomena which have hitherto defied articulation by more conventional 
means. There are good reasons, however, why aspects of social complexity have 
resisted clear articulation for so long. The embedded nature of social systems; the 
sheer number of components involved, and the even greater number of connections 
between them; the fact that they are dynamic, in constant formation, constantly 
adjusting themselves to movements and historical effects both within and external to 
themselves; the permeable nature of boundaries between systems; and the fact that 
human elements of larger systems have consciousness, and can thus act intentionally 
upon such systems (as well as unconsciously carrying out actions in response to 
biological and social rules of which they are quite unaware) – these are all aspects of 
social reality which researchers already know exist. The challenge of attempting to 
acknowledge these issues formally, in terms of theory, is enormous, even before 
coming to the problem of how phenomena conceptualised in this way might be 
studied.  
 
In attempting to use complexity to consider the failure of HSP policies in schools, 
Keshavarz et al (2010) have taken an important step in a direction which, although 
not altogether new, is nonetheless underdeveloped and much needed in their field. If 
researchers are serious about the implications of complexity, however, I would 
suggest that there is still a great deal of work to be done in terms of articulating a 
coherent response to complexity’s challenge to the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions which underpin most approaches to empirical research k.  
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